UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22623
20 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters, the most recent being our letter No. 108 of 16 May 1991, I have the honour to inform you of the barbarous crimes committed by the Iranians against Iraqi units in violation of the provisions of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, as follows:

First,

1. On 1 May 1991, 52 Iraqi corpses were found in the southern sector (map of Al-Sibah), and on 2 May 1991, 48 further corpses were found in the same sector (map of Al-Tahira).

2. Both groups had been executed collectively by Iranian infiltrators in the Kut Sawada district.

3. The hands of the martyrs had been bound behind their backs and they had been blindfolded and thrown face down on the ground collectively, next to one another.

4. Most of the wounds were concentrated in the region of the head; some of the corpses showed traces of exemplary punishment by being stabbed in the head with a large knife.

5. The martyrs had been stripped of their military clothes and all documents in order to prevent recognition.

6. The Iranians executed both groups in the last week of March 1991.

7. On 14 May 1991, two groups of corpses of Iraqi martyrs were found in the Al-Kushk al-Busra district in the southern sector (map of Al-Tahira). They had been executed by Iranian infiltrators from inside Iranian territory; they had also been executed collectively at two separate localities. The first group comprised 20 corpses; they had been killed and dragged to a

READEX FICHE

communications trench; their hands were bound and they were blindfolded. The second group had been killed and covered with earth; among that group, 7 corpses were apparent and decomposing.

Second,

1. On 14 May 1991 at 1800 hours, an Iranian force estimated at the strength of an infantry regiment supported by a force of armour and armed personnel carriers was observed in the Ghuzil district of the central sector of Iraq; tank tracks coming from inside Iran were noted at a distance of 2 kilometres inside Iraqi territory in the above-mentioned district.

2. On 14 May 1991 at 2130 hours, the Iranians shelled Iraqi forward units near the new Qutaybah control post in the central sector with 81 millimetre cannons; 3 shells were fired. At 2230 hours on the same date, the Iranians shelled Iraqi unit positions near the old Al-Husayn control post in the above-mentioned sector with 60 millimetre cannons.

3. On 15 May 1991 at 1120 hours, the Iranians fired two tank shells in the direction of Iraqi units in the village of Fayruz Khan in the central sector of Iraq.

Third,

1. On 13 May 1991 at 0700 hours, seven Iranian infiltrators were arrested inside Iraqi territory by the people of the village of Al-Jisr in Balad Ruz district.

These fresh violations, which are added to the previous Iranian violations of the cease-fire between the two countries, of which you have been informed by previous notes, once again confirm the persistence of the Iranian Government in its deliberate endeavour to infringe the sovereignty and security of Iraq, and its repeated attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. The Government of my country stresses once again the full responsibility of the Iranian Government for the damage caused to Iraq by these violations and for any future consequences thereof.

By informing you of these violations I request you to take whatever measures to stop them that may be stipulated by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/22624
20 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to invite your attention to the latest Iraqi violation of the terms of cease-fire which in fact amounts to an act of aggression by Iraqi forces against the Islamic Republic of Iran resulting in martyrdom of one and injury of ten other Iranians.

On 15 May 1991, at 0500 hours, Iraqi soldiers along with members of an Iranian anti-revolutionary terrorist group, forming an armoured brigade supported by artillery fire carried out an offensive attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran in Tileh Kooh axis up to Hedayat border post north of Ghasr-e-Shirin. Hedayat border post at the GCs of ND 51-27 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin was heavily targeted by Iraqi forces. Several other artillery and mortar shells hit Iranian territory in Tileh Kooh axis and Bishegan. As a result of this Iraqi act of aggression one Iranian was martyred and ten others were injured.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/22625
21 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1991 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit, for the purpose of registration, a list of further violations of the terms of the cease-fire by Iraqi forces. These violations had been reported to the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) at the time they had taken place. The numerical sequence of these violations follows the sequence of those previously reported and circulated as Security Council document S/22268.

3186. On 17 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired 40 rounds from heavy machine-guns and Dush-K from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3187. On 19 December 1989, Iraqi forces fired two rounds of mortar from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3188. On 19 December 1989, a base was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 571-818 on the map of Garmab.

3189. On 20 December 1989, a Dush-K firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 483-107 on the map of Kharatha.

3190. On 20 December 1989, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 484-088 on the map of Kharatha.

3191. On 20 December 1989, during one hour at night, Iraqi forces fired two rounds of mortar from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3192. On 20 December 1989, at night, Iraqi forces fired 30 to 40 rounds from Dush-K from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3193. On 21 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired about 30 rounds from Dush-K from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3194. On 22 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired 60 to 70 rounds from Dush-K and heavy machine-guns from Sivagaz towards Champara and Aseman Bin.

3195. From 22 to 26 December 1989, a bunker was improved by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NF 296-017 on the map of Sardasht.

3196. From 23 to 28 December 1989, 50 Iraqi commandos opened fire in the vicinity of Shiler Valley.

3197. On 24 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired four rounds of mortar from Sivagaz towards north-west Shakh Eshkout and Champara.

3198. On 25 December 1989, a 25-metre-long embankment was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 559-958 on the map of Kharatha.

3199. On 25 December 1989, a 50-metre-long embankment was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 555-956 on the map of Kharatha.

3200. On 27 December 1989, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PD 05-90 on the map of Nosud.

3201. On 27 December 1989, Iraqi forces in two instances demolished rural houses with explosive materials in the Sivagaz area.

3202. On 27 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired 50 rounds from heavy machine-guns from Sivagaz towards the south-east of Aseman Bin.

3203. On 27 December 1989, Iraqi forces fired three rounds of mortar from Sivagaz towards the south-east of Aseman Bin.

3204. On 28 December 1989, during two hours, Iraqi forces demolished houses by explosive materials in the Sivagaz area.

3205. On 28 December 1989, at 1400 hours, one Iraqi helicopter landed on Soor Kouh height at regiment base for 15 minutes and flew away at the geographic coordinates of NR 962-693 on the map of Baneh.

3206. On 28 December 1989, two accommodation shelters were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 299-966 on the map of Sardasht.

3207. On 28 December 1989, five prefabricated bunkers were installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NF 266-014 on the map of Sardasht.

3208. On 28 December 1989, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 271-989 on the map of Sardasht.

3209. On 29 December 1989, during two hours at night, Iraqi forces fired 200 rounds from Dush-K and heavy machine-guns from Sivagaz towards lower Shakh Eshkout and the opposite area.

3210. On 29 December 1989, during two hours at night, Iraqi forces fired six rounds of mortar from Sivagaz towards Aseman Bin.

3211. On 29 December 1989, Iraqi forces fired with mortar and heavy machine-guns in and around the geographic coordinates of NE 728-639 and NE 700-640 on the map of Baneh.

3212. On 29 December 1989, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 914-397 on the map of Marivan.

3213. On 29 December 1989, a base was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 960-625 on the map of Nanoor.

3214. On 29 December 1989, a base was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 943-628 on the map of Nanoor.

3215. On 30 December 1989, during one hour, Iraqi forces fired 20 rounds from Dush-K from Sivagaz towards Champara.

3216. On 30 December 1989, a shelter was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 271-888 on the map of Sardasht.

3217. On 30 December 1989, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PD 088-941 on the map of Nasoud.

3218. On 30 December 1989, a light machine-gun was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 554-964 on the map of Kharatha.

3219. On 30 December 1989, three RPGs-7 were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 559-958 on the map of Kharatha.

3220. On 31 December 1989, a communication pylon was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 181-005 on the map of Dehloran.

3221. On 31 December 1989, a road with a length of 100 metres was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 546-525 on the map of Sumar.

3222. On 31 December 1989, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 27-96 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3223. On 1 January 1990, six bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 77-24 on the map of Halaleh.

3224. On 2 January 1990, a guard post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 619-331 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3225. On 2 January 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 149-768 on the map of Mehran.

3226. On 2 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TQ 81-33 on the map of Talul.

3227. On 2 January 1990, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 611-327 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3228. On 2 January 1990, a 20-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 621-334 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3229. On 2 January 1990, two observation posts were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 693-265 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3230. On 2 January 1990, Iraqi troops reinforced their forces with the strength of 20 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of ND 678-212 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3231. On 2 January 1990, at 1130 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 892-312 on the map of Panjwain.

3232. On 2 January 1990, at 2225 hours, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of 20 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NC 678-212 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3233. On 3 January 1990, two group bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 151-767 on the map of Mehran.

3234. On 4 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 703-396 on the map of West Jofeir.

3235. On 4 January 1990, at 0930 hours, Iraqi forces set up a 10-metre-long mine field at the geographic coordinates of NC 511-692 on the map of Sizdeh.

3236. On 4 January 1990, at 1530 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NB 142-802 on the map of Mehran.

3237. On 5 January 1990, two bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 064-987 on the map of Gotbeh Mountain.

3238. On 5 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was removed from the top of a spring by Iraqi soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NC 52-56 on the map of Sumar.

3239. On 5 January 1990, at 1230 hours, three Iranian soldiers (Alamdad Shaygan, armed, Ghadam Ali Karimi, unarmed, and Nader Kabootar Ahang, unarmed) were taken captive by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of 91-32 on the map of Marivan.

3240. On 6 January 1990, at 1500 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces over height 654 at the geographic coordinates of ND 692-216 on the map of Ghalmeh.

3241. On 7 January 1990, at 2300 hours, Iraqi forces replaced their frontline troops from the geographic coordinates of TP 315-566 to TP 293-581 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3242. On 7 January 1990, Iraqi forces began training their troops at the geographic coordinates of TP 2675-6155 and TP 2675-6100 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3243. On 8 January 1990, at 1010 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 60-49 on the map of Chananeh.

3244. On 8 January 1990, at 1530 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 58-45 on the map of West Jofeir.

3245. On 9 January 1990, at 1130 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 97-52 on the map of Marivan.

3246. On 9 January 1990, at 1615 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was seen patrolling at the geographic coordinates of TQ 15-30 on the map of Hosseinieh.

3247. On 10 January 1990, at 1025 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 304-868 on the map of Sardasht.

3248. On 10 January 1990, at 1025 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up around a mine-field by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 304-868 on the map of Sardasht.

3249. On 10 January 1990, at 1230 hours, a 15-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 501-633 on the map of Sizdeh.

3250. On 10 January 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 78-23 on the map of Halaleh.

3251. On 10 January 1990, at 1530 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 401-831 on the map of Ein-Khosh.

3252. On 11 January 1990, a missile was installed over a tank by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 252-986 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3253. On 11 January 1990, at 1050 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 523-003 on the map of Kharatha.

3254. On 11 January 1990, at 1400 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 881-124 on the map of Halabeh.

3255. On 11 January 1990, at 1600 hours, a 15-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 532-998 on the map of Kharatha.

3256. On 11 January 1990, at 1100 hours, a 10-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 530-996 on the map of Kharatha.

3257. On 11 January 1990, at 1300-1900 hours, mines were planted by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 780-599 on the map of Baneh.

3258. On 11 January 1990, Iraqi forces opened fire at Iranian positions at the geographic coordinates of TP 1675-9560 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3259. On 12 January 1990, an Iraqi diver was observed penetrating Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of TP 1730-9225 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3260. On 12 January 1990, a sandbag bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 705-464 on the map of Azgaleh.

3261. On 12 January 1990, a bunker was constructed and a trench was dug by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of NC 921-114 on the map of Halaleh to NC 931-102 on the map of Serni.

3262. On 13 January 1990, at 1650 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up around a base by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 994-504 on the map of Marivan.

3263. On 13 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 750-614 on the map of Azgaleh.

3264. On 13 January 1990, mines were planted by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 750-614 on the map of Azgaleh.

3265. On 13 January 1990, an Iraqi boat was observed patrolling at the geographic coordinates of TP 1730-9225 on the map of Nim Istgah Navad.

3266. On 13 January 1990, nine Iraqi forces penetrated the no man's land at the geographic coordinates of ND 617-223 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3267. On 13 January 1990, nine Iraqi forces demolished an Iranian observation post on their way back at the geographic coordinates of ND 617-223 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3268. On 13 January 1990, at 2230 hours, an inactive bunker was demolished by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 618-221 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3269. On 13 January 1990, at 2230 hours, a 10-man reconnaissance patrol party approached Iranian positions at the geographic coordinates of ND 618-221 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3270. On 13 January 1990, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 953-102 on the map of Serni.

3271. On 13 January 1990, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 016-981 on the map of Saleh-Abad.

3272. On 14 January 1990, at 0650 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed patrolling at the geographic coordinates of NC 50-95 on the map of Kharatha.

3273. On 14 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 566-194 on the map of Faw.

3274. On 14 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 568-192 on the map of Faw.

3275. On 14 January 1990, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 478-110 on the map of Kharatha.

3276. On 14 January 1990, a 30-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 485-091 on the map of Kharatha.

3277. On 14 January 1990, an individual bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 484-089 on the map of Kharatha.

3278. On 15 January 1990, at 0845 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 135-744 on the map of Mehran.

3279. On 15 January 1990, at 0845 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 135-744 on the map of Mehran.

3280. On 15 January 1990, at 1000 hours, four individual bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 977-528 on the map of Marivan.

3281. On 15 January 1990, at 1030 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 89-23 on the map of Shanderi Khoaro.

3282. On 15 January 1990, at 1145 hours, an ambush bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QV 869-324 on the map of Talool.

3283. On 15 January 1990, at 1225 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 482-083 on the map of Kharatha.

3284. On 15 January 1990, at 1255 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 483-083 on the map of Kharatha.

3285. On 15 January 1990, at 1400 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 901-399 on the map of Panjwain.

3286. On 15 January 1990, at 1645 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 482-083 on the map of Kharatha.

3287. On 15 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 802-628 on the map of Azgalah.

3288. On 15 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops by 25 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NE 384-805 on the map of Gak.

3289. On 15 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops by 25 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NE 384-814 on the map of Gak.

3290. On 15 January 1990, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 805-632 on the map of Azgaleh.

3291. On 15 January 1990, two observation posts were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 932-096 on the map of Serni.

3292. On 15 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 808-635 on the map of Azgaleh.

3293. On 15 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 812-714 to the geographic coordinates of ND 819-691 on the map of Azgaleh.

3294. On 15 January 1990, blockades were set up by Iraqi forces in the no man's land at the geographic coordinates of TP 178-765 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3295. On 15 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up in the no man's land by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 177-749 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3296. On 16 January 1990, a communication antenna was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NF 289-022 on the map of Sardasht.

3297. On 16 January 1990, at 1100-1600 hours, a 60-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan.

3298. On 16 January 1990, at 1300 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 894-148 on the map of Halaleh.

3299. On 17 January 1990, at 1430 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 953-069 on the map of Saleh-Abad.

3300. On 17 January 1990, a 4-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 563-493 on the map of Sumar.

3301. On 17 January 1990, an observation post was repaired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 563-493 on the map of Sumar.

3302. On 18 January 1990, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 595-424 on the map of Sumar.

3303. On 18 January 1990, a flag was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 2250-7325 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3304. On 18 January 1990, five bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 227-731 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3305. On 18 January 1990, at 1000 hours, a flag was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 229-733 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3306. On 18 January 1990, at 1100 hours, a flag was installed in the no man's land by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 211-744 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3307. On 18 January 1990, at 1330 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 486-083 on the map of Kharatha.

3308. On 19 January 1990, two resting bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 765-596 on the map of Azgaleh.

3309. On 19 January 1990, at 1030 hours, a row of barbed wire 3 kilometres long was set up by three groups of five Iraqi soldiers from the geographic coordinates of ND 580-232 to ND 610-232 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3310. On 19 January 1990, at 1500-1600 hours, a 400-metre-barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 677-210 to ND 673-210 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3311. On 19 January 1990, at 1640 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan.

3312. On 19 January 1990, at 1645 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 281-884 on the map of Sardasht.

3313. On 19 January 1990, at 1740 hours, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 009-531 on the map of Marivan.

3314. On 19 January 1990, at 1745 hours, Iraqi forces fired five rounds of machine-guns at an Iranian boat at the geographic coordinates of TP 280-697 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3315. On 19 January 1990, at 1830 hours, an Iraqi plane was seen patrolling towards the north-west of Sardasht at the geographic coordinates of NE 30-86 on the map of Sardasht.

3316. On 20 January 1990, a flag was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 61-22 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3317. On 20 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops at the geographic coordinates of NC 61-22 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3318. On 20 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops at the geographic coordinates of NC 61-32 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3319. On 20 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 232-005 on the map of Dehloran.

3320. On 20 January 1990, a group bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 384-876 on the map of Ein Khosh.

3321. On 20 January 1990, at 0950 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 555-945 on the map of Kharatha.

3322. On 20 January 1990, at 1010 hours, Iraqi forces demolished houses in Badelan village at the geographic coordinates of NE 996-537 on the map of Marivan.

3323. On 20 January 1990, at 1030 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed shuttling between the geographic coordinates of NC 64-27 and the geographic coordinates of NC 67-27 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3324. On 20 January 1990, at 1030 hours, a flag was installed over one firing position by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 181-758 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3325. On 20 January 1990, at 1330 hours, two mortar positions were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan.

3326. On 20 January 1990, at 1330 hours, two mortar positions were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 008-532 on the map of Marivan.

3327. On 20 January 1990, at 1330 hours, two mortars were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 008-532 on the map of Marivan.

3328. On 20 January 1990, at 1330 hours, Iraqi forces were reinforced by the strength of a company at the geographic coordinates of PE 0021-5245 on the map of Marivan.

3329. On 20 January 1990, at 1330 hours, two individual bunkers were constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan.

3330. On 20 January 1990, at 1600 hours, two mortars were deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan.

3331. On 20 January 1990, at 1645 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QB 232-005 on the map of Dehloran.

3332. On 20 January 1990, at 2315 hours, two warning shots were fired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 54-97 on the map of Kharatha.

3333. On 20 January 1990, at 2315 hours, seven illuminating bullets were fired by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 067-838 and PB 090-820 on the map of Saleh-Abad.

3334. On 20 January 1990, rows of barbed wire were set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 667-218, 668-217, 496-185, 642-214, 638-219, 628-226 and 616-227 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3335. On 20 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 486-137 on the map of Kharatha.

3336. On 20 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 494-185 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin to the geographic coordinates of ND 494-168 on the map of Kharatha.

3337. On 21 January 1990, engineering activities were carried out by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 4405-5045 on the map of Abadan.

3338. On 21 January 1990, mines were planted by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 4390-5075 on the map of Abadan.

3339. On 21 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 4390-5075 on the map of Abadan.

3340. On 21 January 1990, a blockade was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of TP 4390-5075 on the map of Abadan.

3341. On 21 January 1990, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 53-55 on the map of Yebis.

3342. On 21 January 1990, a bath was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 53-55 on the map of Yebis.

3343. On 21 January 1990, at 0910 hours, a Dush-K was deployed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PE 011-532 on the map of Marivan and after being tested, it was carried to PE 994-537 on the map of Marivan.

3344. On 21 January 1990, at 1030 hours, a trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NE 917-389 on the map of Marivan.

3345. On 21 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 695-309 on the map of Ghalameh.

3346. On 21 January 1990, at 1030 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 593-239 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3347. On 21 January 1990, at 1600 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by the Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 637-215 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3348. On 21 January 1990, at 1600 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 662-212 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3349. On 21 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops at the geographic coordinates of PB 14-54 on the map of Mehran.

3350. On 21 January 1990, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops at the geographic coordinates of PB 14-50 on the map of Mehran.

3351. On 21 January 1990, at 1300 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 348-908 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

3352. On 21 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 73-22 on the map of Chazzabeh.

3353. On 21 January 1990, at 1930 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed patrolling at the geographic coordinates of TQ 68-28 on the map of Talool.

3354. On 22 January 1990, at 0915 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were observed patrolling at the geographic coordinates of NB 97-63 on the map of Mehran.

3355. On 22 January 1990, at 1515 hours, a long pole was installed for setting barbed wire by the Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 49-16 on the map of Kharatha.

3356. On 22 January 1990, at 1515 hours, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 522-228 to ND 524-229 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3357. On 22 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 713-502 on the map of Azgaleh.

3358. On 22 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 715-513 on the map of Azgaleh.

3359. On 22 January 1990, at 1700 hours, Iraqi forces reinforced their troops with the strength of 30 soldiers at the geographic coordinates of NC 555-969 on the map of Kharatha.

3360. On 22 January 1990, at 0830 hours, Iraqi forces were observed moving in and out of a Chinese ship at the geographic coordinates of TP 2800-6590 on the map of Khorramshahr.

3361. On 22 January 1990, a 50-metre-long trench was dug by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 51-59 on the map of Sumar.

3362. On 23 January 1990, at 1000 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 141-762 on the map of Mehran.

3363. On 23 January 1990, at 1000 hours, a row of barbed wire was constructed by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 702-217 to ND 298-218 on the map of Ghalameh.

3364. On 23 January 1990, at 1330 hours, a telephone pole was installed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 689-239 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

3365. On 23 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was installed by Iraqi forces from the geographic coordinates of ND 702-217 to ND 698-218 on the map of Ghalameh.

3366. On 24 January 1990, at 1100 hours, a firing position was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 929-120 on the map of Halaleh.

3367. On 24 January 1990, at 1320 hours, four pipes were unloaded for construction of a bridge by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 558-952 on the map of Kharatha.

3368. On 24 January 1990, at 1600 hours, an observation post was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 558-952 on the map of Sizdeh.

3369. On 24 January 1990, at 1630 hours, a bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 557-962 on the map of Kharatha.

3370. On 24 January 1990, a row of barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 53-00 on the map of Kharatha.

3371. On 24 January 1990, a row of concertina barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of PB 147-795 on the map of Mehran.

3372. On 24 January 1990, a row of 200-metre-long barbed wire was set up by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of ND 531-008 on the map of Kharatha.

3373. On 24 January 1990, a firing bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 545-996 on the map of Kharatha.

3374. On 24 January 1990, a firing bunker was constructed by Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 563-966 on the map of Kharatha.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/1015
S/22626
20 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda items 23, 35 and 75
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER
ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 20 May 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of the State of Palestine, I bring the following to your immediate attention:

On 18 May 1991, Israel, the occupying Power, expelled four Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian territory to Lebanon. Their names are as follows:

1. Hashim Ahmed Ali, 31 years old, from Jabaliya Camp in Gaza.

2. Jamal Abid El Nasser Abu Jabal, 23 years old, from Jabaliya Camp in Gaza.

3. Jamal Mohammed Abu-Eljedian, 34 years old, from Beit Lahiaya in Gaza.

4. Muin Mohammad Husam, 31 years old, from Jabaliya Camp in Gaza.

Palestine stresses once again that their expulsion constitutes a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights and many United Nations resolutions on the question of Palestine, in particular Security Council resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989), 641 (1989) and 681 (1990).

Israel, the occupying Power, should be made to ensure the safe and immediate return of all those expelled Palestinians to their homes in occupied Palestine and to desist from committing further such violations.

This dangerous deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, requires immediate action from the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 23, 35 and 75 and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Dr. Riyad MANSOUR
Deputy Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the United Nations
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22627
20 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION

Introduction

1. I expect soon to be in a position to report to the Security Council that the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) has successfully fulfilled the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988, namely to verify the redeployment to the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, according to the timetable agreed by Angola and Cuba on 22 December 1988 (S/20345), which provides for the total withdrawal to be concluded on 1 July 1991.

2. The purpose of the present report is to advise the Security Council on how it might wish to respond to a request that has been transmitted to me by the Government of Angola and which, if accepted by the Security Council, would make it necessary to enlarge and prolong the mandate of UNAVEM.

3. As members of the Security Council will be aware, four documents, known collectively as the Peace Accords for Angola, were initialled at Estoril, Portugal, on 1 May 1991 by delegations of the Government of Angola (hereinafter "the Government") and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Peace Accords for Angola are the result of a process of negotiation that has taken place between the two Angolan delegations, with the mediation of the Government of Portugal and with the participation of observers from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. As I informed the Security Council in informal consultations on 26 March 1991, my Deputy Military Adviser took part in the latter stages of the negotiations as a technical adviser on the cease-fire aspects.

4. On 15 May 1991 the two Angolan delegations informed the mediator that the Peace Accords for Angola had been approved by their respective sides and that, as a result, a de facto suspension of hostilities would come into effect on

that day. It was further agreed that the Accords would be signed at Lisbon on 31 May 1991 (S/22617).

5. On 17 May 1991 I received a letter dated 8 May 1991 from the Minister for External Relations of Angola which enclosed the texts of the Peace Accords and requested me to take action in order to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Accords and, to that end, to inform the Security Council of the necessity to prolong UNAVEM's presence in Angola until general elections had been held during the period between September and November 1992. The Minister's letter, together with the text of the Peace Accords for Angola, has been circulated as document S/22609.

Verification tasks arising from the Angola Peace Accords

6. The arrangements for the cease-fire are set out in detail in the Cease-fire Agreement which, together with its annexes and appendices, constitutes the first of the four documents in the Peace Accords for Angola. The modalities for the verification and monitoring of the cease-fire are described in sections III and IV of that document and amplified in its annex I. They may be summarized as follows:

(a) A Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) would be formed and would be composed of representatives of the Government and of UNITA, as members, and of representatives of Portugal, the Soviet Union and the United States, as observers. A representative of the United Nations could be invited to participate in the meetings of CCPM;

(b) A Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) would be formed with the same composition as CCPM. A representative of the United Nations would be invited to its meetings. It would report to CCPM. It would be responsible for ensuring the effective observance of the cease-fire;

(c) CMVF would establish monitoring groups, which would be subordinate to it and would be composed, in equal numbers, of representatives of the Government and of UNITA. They would be unarmed;

(d) The monitoring groups would be responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, including responsibility for preventing, verifying and investigating possible violations of it;

(e) The monitoring groups would be organized in 6 regions and would be deployed on a full-time basis at each of 50 locations ("assembly areas") where the troops of the 2 sides would be assembled during the cease-fire, 27 of the areas being for government troops and the other 23 for those of UNITA. In addition, the monitoring groups would be deployed at 32 airports and 22 ports, of which 22 coincide with, or are in close proximity to, assembly areas. There would thus be 82 locations at which the monitoring groups would be deployed on a full-time basis;

(f) United Nations personnel, who would have their own command structure, would be deployed on a full-time basis at the 50 assembly areas and at 12 other "critical points" and would undertake regular patrols to certain other locations. They would verify that the monitoring groups were assuming their responsibilities. This would include United Nations support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. The security of the United Nations personnel, who would also be unarmed, would be the responsibility of the party that controlled the zone where they were present.

7. The timetable envisaged for the cease-fire is set out in section V of the Cease-fire Agreement (S/22609, p. 7). The United Nations verification operations would begin as soon as the Cease-fire Agreement was signed on 31 May 1991. The monitoring groups would be operational by 15 June 1991 and the United Nations verification capability would be fully deployed by 30 June 1991, whereupon the troops of the two sides would begin to move to the assembly areas. That movement would be completed by 1 August 1991.

8. In addition to the verification of the cease-fire, the Accords also refer to a possible role for the United Nations in monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period. This reference is in section III of the Protocol of Estoril (S/22609, p. 49). The neutrality of the police, whose functions and activities would be the Government's responsibility, would be verified and monitored by teams of monitors composed of two members designated by the Government and two by UNITA, plus one expert in police affairs designated by and under the command structure of the United Nations. The monitoring teams would visit police facilities, examine their activities and investigate possible violations of political rights by the police. They would report to CCPM (see para. 6 (a) above). In principle there would be 3 such teams in each of Angola's 18 provinces, but this number could be modified as necessary.

9. The Peace Accords for Angola also contain references to a possible request to the United Nations for technical advice on certain electoral matters (Estoril Protocol, sect. I, para. 4 (S/22609, p. 46)) and to the supervision of the elections by international election observers (S/22609, pp. 42 and 45). It is understood, however, that the two sides have not yet decided which international organization or organizations they will request to provide such assistance. Should they decide to approach the United Nations, I shall of course make a further report to the Security Council.

Possible enlargement and prolongation of UNAVEM's mandate

10. If the Security Council should decide, as recommended below, to accept the Angolan Government's request that the verification tasks attributed to the United Nations in the Peace Accords for Angola be entrusted to UNAVEM, this could be achieved in the manner described below. These proposals are based on consultations that were conducted with the two Angolan parties during the

recent negotiations in Portugal, with the active participation of the mediator and the two observer delegations.

11. With effect from the date of signature of the Peace Accords for Angola and the formal entry into force of the cease-fire, UNAVEM's mandate would be enlarged to include:

(a) Verification of the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the cease-fire, as set out in the Cease-fire Agreement, which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola;

(b) Verification of the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the cease-fire period, as set out in section III of the Estoril Protocol, which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 below.

12. UNAVEM would, of course, continue to implement its original mandate of verifying the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola until that withdrawal is concluded on 1 July 1991, at which time I will report to the Security Council on the completion of the original mandate.

13. UNAVEM's new mandate would last from the date on which the cease-fire enters into force, namely 31 May 1991, until the day following the completion of presidential and legislative elections in Angola, which are to be held in the period between 1 September and 30 November 1992 (Estoril Protocol, sect. I, para. 9 (S/22609, p. 47)).

14. The provisions of paragraph 5 of my report of 17 December 1988 (S/20338) would continue to apply to UNAVEM, except that:

(a) Given the expansion in the Mission's strength and the increased complexity of its tasks, it would be appropriate to raise the rank of the Chief Military Observer to Major-General after the present Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, lays down his command in July 1991, after 31 months of distinguished service to the United Nations. I would in due course consult the Security Council in the usual way about the appointment of his successor;

(b) After the report that I intend to present in July 1991, the timing of subsequent reports to the Security Council would be determined by developments in the peace process in Angola, subject to any guidance that the Security Council might wish to provide on this point.

15. UNAVEM's new organization and deployment, under the overall command of the Chief Military Observer, would include the following elements:

(a) Its headquarters, which would remain at Luanda, and six regional headquarters collocated with the CMVF regional headquarters referred to in paragraph 6 (e) above;

(b) A group of up to 350 military observers who would be deployed as follows:

(i) At the Mission and regional headquarters, including mobile rapid reaction teams that would defuse incidents and carry out investigations at locations where there was no resident UNAVEM presence;

(ii) In teams of 5, at each of the 50 assembly areas (see para. 6 (e) above);

(iii) In teams of not less than 2, at 12 "critical points", agreed by the 2 sides, at certain ports, airfields and border crossings;

(iv) In mobile patrols, which would make regular visits to all border crossings other than those at the critical points that would have a resident UNAVEM presence;

(c) A group of up to 90 police observers who would be deployed, in teams of 4, in each province;

(d) An air unit consisting of 3 fixed-wing aircraft and 12 utility helicopters;

(e) A medical unit of 14 all ranks;

(f) Civilian support personnel drawn from the United Nations Secretariat, numbering approximately 80 persons, together with a similar number of locally recruited staff.

16. The main responsibility for implementing UNAVEM's mandate regarding the cease-fire would fall on the teams of military observers deployed at the 50 assembly areas and elsewhere in the field. These verification teams would work closely with, but would remain separate from, the monitoring groups composed of representatives of the two parties. They would observe closely the manner in which those groups were carrying out their functions in order to verify that the joint monitoring machinery was working effectively. They would respond to requests for assistance and would use their good offices to resolve any problems that might arise within the monitoring groups. Each of the teams deployed at assembly areas would patrol the whole extent of its assembly area and verify that the parties were complying with the detailed rules relating to such areas, which are set out in appendix 4 to annex I of the Cease-fire Agreement (S/22609, p. 28).

17. As regards the monitoring of the Angolan police, both Angolan parties have agreed that, notwithstanding what is stated in section III, paragraph 2.1 of the Estoril Protocol (S/22609, p. 49), the UNAVEM police observers would not be members of the monitoring teams but, like their military colleagues, would work closely with the Angolan teams, while maintaining a separate identity and being under the United Nations chain of command. It has also

been agreed that the UNAVEM police observers would normally work in pairs and that not all patrols by the Angolan monitoring teams would be accompanied by UNAVEM observers.

18. Both parties have agreed that they would establish appropriate liaison arrangements with UNAVEM at their respective headquarters. The Government has also confirmed that the status agreement concluded between it and the United Nations when UNAVEM was established would remain in force.

19. Turning to the composition of UNAVEM, it would be my intention, having consulted the two sides, to request the 10 Member States that already contribute military observers to the Mission to increase substantially the size of their contingents. Given the proposed strength of the Mission, it would also be necessary to find additional contributors of military observers, as well as of support units. I have received suggestions in this respect from the two Angolan parties and I will present proposals to the Security Council, after the usual consultations, if the Council decides to accept the recommendations contained in the present report.

20. A preliminary estimate of the cost to the United Nations of enlarging and prolonging UNAVEM's mandate in the manner described above and my observations on financing of the Mission will be circulated in an addendum to the present report.

Observations

21. It is a matter of great satisfaction that an end is at last in sight to the cruel war that has ravaged Angola for too long. I congratulate all concerned - the Government and UNITA, the mediator and the two observer delegations - for their statesmanship and diplomatic skill in negotiating the Peace Accords for Angola. Now that the two sides have confirmed their acceptance of the Accords, it is of the greatest importance that all hostilities should cease and that the de facto cease-fire should be observed. It is distressing that there should have been so much loss of life since the Accords were initialled on 1 May 1991. I appeal to both sides to ensure that no further fighting occurs during the coming weeks while the mechanisms for monitoring and verifying the cease-fire are put in place.

22. The concepts set out in the Cease-fire Agreement for the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire seem to me to be sound, provided that the two sides adhere scrupulously to their commitments under the Accords and that their representatives work together in a new spirit of cooperation and national reconciliation. By entrusting the main tasks to the parties themselves, the arrangements proposed would have the advantage of reducing the costs to the international community at a time when there is an ever-growing demand for funds for peace-keeping.

23. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council take the earliest possible decision to enlarge and prolong the mandate of UNAVEM in order to enable it to carry out the new verification tasks arising from the Peace Accords for Angola, on the basis of the proposals contained in the present report.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22627/Add.1
29 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council (S/22627), I indicated in paragraph 20 that my observations on the financing of enlarging and prolonging the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) would be circulated as an addendum to the report.

2. Given the nature of the added tasks for which UNAVEM would be responsible, it would be essential to provide it with the necessary resources required for its new organization and deployment as stated in paragraph 15 of my report. In this regard, the logistic support to UNAVEM must include a reliable communications system and adequate air and ground transportation facilities. The total cost of UNAVEM for the 18-month period, June 1991-November 1992, including one-time major procurements of portable shelters, vehicles and communications equipment, is estimated to be approximately $132.3 million, consisting of $60.6 million for the first 7-month period and $71.7 million for the remaining 11 months. These are preliminary estimates, which might be subject to revision as further details are clarified.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to enlarge and prolong the mandate of UNAVEM, that its cost should continue to be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. I would further recommend to the Assembly that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the existing UNAVEM special account.

91-17412 2301c (E)

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22628
22 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SAINT LUCIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you, in your capacity of President of the Security Council, that the Government of Saint Lucia supports fully the aspiration of the Republic of Korea to become a Member of the United Nations. Saint Lucia is of the view that the Republic of Korea's membership in the Organization would be most consistent with the principle of universality embodied in the spirit of the Charter.

In this regard, the Government of Saint Lucia supports the memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Korea contained in Security Council document S/22455 of 9 April 1991.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Charles S. FLEMMING
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-16478 2313i (E)

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22629
21 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to have the enclosed document containing the comments of the Permanent Representative on Security Council resolution 692 of 20 May 1991 circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Comments of the Permanent Representative of Iraq, Dr. Abdul Amir A. Al-Anbari, on Security Council resolution 692 of 20 May 1991

The adoption by the Security Council of a procedural decision which does not allow any discussion or opinion to be voiced on resolution 692 (1991) is a most dangerous decision and constitutes a grave precedent by making the deliberations and resolutions of the Security Council analogous to a closed club cut off from the view of international public opinion and the States Members of the United Nations. Therefore, the Iraqi mission sees it as its duty to express the position of Iraq with regard to the decision and to bring its gravity to the attention of the Member States.

Throughout the cold war period, the Security Council refrained from exercising its prerogatives and duties, in particular with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It did so by virtue of the pro-Israeli policy of the United States; the United States used the veto against any resolution which condemned Israel or attempted to protect the Palestinian people. A notable exception in this regard was the vote of the United States in 1981 with the other members of the Security Council to condemn Israel for its aggressive attack on the peaceful Iraqi nuclear installation, as well as to force Israel to pay reparations to Iraq for the losses resulting from its aggressive attack.

However, the Council then continued its traditional policy of failing to impose its will on Israel and force it to respect international legality and implement the Security Council resolutions. It took no steps to force Israel to pay reparations to Iraq in accordance with the resolution which the Council had adopted.

With the end of the cold war, the Council became more active, not, however, so much as a Council for international security, but rather as a tool and umbrella used to lend a semblance of international legality to the aggressive American policy. Resolution 678 (1990) was a turning point in the history of the United Nations: the Council relinquished its prerogatives and duties to maintain international peace and security, as laid down in Articles 42 to 49 of the Charter of the United Nations, and authorized the United States of America and its partners in aggression to use force against Iraq, not in order to achieve the objectives of the Security Council, nor under its supervision and leadership, but rather to achieve the objectives of the United States of America and its partners in aggression to destroy Iraq and put an end to its military, economic, and cultural potential.

The resolution before you today constitutes a new low. If the Council renounced its duties by adopting resolution 678 (1990), it has now claimed for itself prerogatives it did not have, by adopting resolution 692 on 20 May 1991.

In the name of international legality, the Council is violating the very essence of that legality and returning to the law of the jungle, whereby force, rather than the law, rules supreme. Whether with respect to national or international law, the essence of legality does not lie simply in enforcing the law, but rather in enforcing it soundly in such a way as to prevent its misuse; this should be done by observing the "due process of the law".* The Council has flown in the face of this essential principle of juridical legality by establishing a foreign political body which is to be the adversary, arbitrator and policeman, without abiding by any legal norm. And yet it is this body which is to determine the legitimacy of claims and the amounts of reparations, unbound by any law and without Iraq having the right of self-defence or being able to voice its opinion and debate with its adversaries.

In affirmation of the enforcement of international law and non-interference in internal affairs, the Charter of the United Nations constituted an international judicial organ, the International Court of Justice, and specified the sources of law by which the Court should be bound in deciding cases brought before it, including reparation claims, as provided for in Article 36, paragraph 2 (d). Furthermore, it entrusted the Security Council with the task of maintaining international peace and security, but did not grant it judicial authority, which was vested solely in the International Court of Justice. While the Council relinquished its authority to the United States of America and its partners by allowing them to use force against Iraq through resolution 678 (1990), with this new resolution it has exceeded its authority and encroached upon the authority of the International Court of Justice by granting itself the power to establish a body analogous to an international organization whose policy is supervised by a political body called the Governing Council, which is to represent the members of the Council and draw up a general policy on reparations, on how reparation claims shall be decided, and to determine the amounts, which may exceed tens of billions of dollars.

The question which arises, and which the Council should answer, is whence does the Council derive this authority? The Charter, in its 70 Articles, does not contain a single paragraph or word granting the Council such power. This makes the Council the first international arbitrary authority above the law and above the principles of international legality.

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* Translator's note: "due process of the law" in English in the Arabic text.

By stipulating in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1990) that Iraq is liable under international law for any direct loss or damage, it becomes necessary to determine the scope and reasons for Iraq's liability under the rules and procedures of international law, and not according to the interests and policies of the States members of the Security Council. The Council contradicted itself when it presumed to force Iraq to make reparations in accordance with international law without itself abiding by international law in determining the scope of its liability and the legitimacy of reparation claims, and without giving Iraq the right to voice its opinion on the legitimacy of the reparation claims from the point of view of principle and of the volume of reparations.

The Council also violated the norms of international law when it focused on the liability of Iraq for the damage which is claimed to have been inflicted, but did not require the United States and its partners in aggression against Iraq to compensate Iraq for the damage and destruction inflicted on Iraq in violation of all Security Council resolutions and all the Articles of the Charter, despite the fact that the damage inflicted on Iraq has been hundreds of times greater than that inflicted on others.

There is another dangerous element in resolution 692 (1981), which is that by authorizing the Governing Council to determine the level of appropriations from Iraqi oil revenues for the purpose of reparations, the United States and its allies in the Security Council are being given a weapon with which to control indirectly world oil prices and production. Iraq, which has been suffering from a full economic embargo since August 1990, which is likely to last for years to come, in addition to the wholesale destruction it has endured as a result of the air war and land war waged by America and its partners from 16 January 1991 to 28 February 1991, is in need of many times its oil revenue in order to meet the urgent requirements arising from the economic embargo on its exports and imports and the destruction that has been inflicted by military aggression.

For this reason, Iraq has requested a moratorium of five years, during which no part of its limited oil revenues would be appropriated in order that it might be able to provide basic requirements to the Iraqi people. By ignoring this request, the Council is shirking its responsibility to respect human rights, of which the most important is the right to life of the Iraqi people.

By effectively giving the Governing Council the authority to determine the level of appropriations from Iraqi oil revenues, the Security Council will have indirectly given the said Council the authority to determine the level of oil production in Iraq. With Iraq's increasing need for its oil revenues in order to meet its external debts and economic requirements, it will be forced by the high level of appropriations which may be determined by the Governing Council to increase production in order to obtain the greatest possible amount of these revenues. That will be bound to affect supply and demand in the international oil market and consequently world oil prices.

By responding to what America and its allies are attempting to impose on Iraq in this respect, the Council is working to smash the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and to take away its right to control its oil resources and set prices for its exports of crude oil and oil products.

Furthermore, by imposing on Iraq sole liability for all damage and direct losses, resolution 692 (1991) is opening the door wide to all manner of greedy, avid and crafty parties to submit all sorts of false and exaggerated claims with respect to the volume of losses they claim to have sustained without there being any procedural norms for verification, without any international judges to adjudicate on such claims and without Iraq having the right to establish that a claim is not legitimate or that the amount of reparations exceed a reasonable limit.

The practical consequences of these procedures will be to impoverish the Iraqi people for decades to come and to punish the current generation, which has suffered terribly from the economic embargo and military aggression, as well as to punish future generations, who should have no legal or moral liability for acts to which they did not contribute and in which they played no part.

The end result of the resolution is no less than the abrogation of international legality in dealing with the so-called Gulf Crisis, encroachment upon the authority of the International Court of Justice, the weakening of OPEC, the harming of all oil-exporting countries, and the impoverishment and weakening of Iraq and punishment of its future generations. The unavoidable consequences of this state of affairs, if it is allowed to continue, will be to create a political vacuum in the region which will be a focus for international, sectarian and religious conflicts and struggles with untold repercussions for the region and the world.

By its insistence on impoverishing the Iraqi people and gaining control of its oil resources, the Council will have created the necessary conditions for the spread of disease, social unrest and crime as a result of the Council's sanctions aimed at reducing basic commodities and fuelling galloping unemployment and inflation.

This sinister resolution will be no less than a deed placing Iraq under the tutelage of a political body which is neither international nor legal and which has no support in the Charter of the United Nations or any international treaty or legal precedent, and which nevertheless enjoys such absolute powers as has never been granted to any international organization in the history of the United Nations. The Council will thus have sown the seed of destruction of this body, which cannot stand so long as it is not supported by the principles of law and justice and so long as its actions may give rise to damage and destruction in Iraq and in the region. This is bound to reflect on the reputation and credibility of the Security Council and its ability to maintain peace and security in the world.

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/182
S/22630
21 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 21 May 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I hereby inform you of the most recent acts of aggression by Israel against Lebanese territory.

At 3.30 p.m. on Friday, 17 May 1991, two Israeli military aircraft raided the hills of Shabriha, north-east of the city of Tyre in southern Lebanon, using smart bombs, and causing a number of deaths and injuries among the civilian population, and extensive material damage to buildings and property.

On the same day, the towns of Haddatha, Baraasheet and Tebnin were shelled by the Israeli occupation forces and their proxies in a manner which was aimed specifically at crowds and disrupted the daily life of the public.

The Lebanese Government, while deploring and condemning these aggressions against Lebanon and its citizens, considers them a proof of the persistence of Israel in carrying out its role of destruction and disruption of the process of national reconciliation that the Lebanese Government has been pursuing with a view to extending its authority over all Lebanese territory, and in particular to implementing Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which requires the withdrawal of Israel from all Lebanese territory.

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* A/46/50.

The latest Israeli acts of aggression underscore once again the urgent need for action by the United Nations to implement resolution 425 (1978) in order to secure stability and security in Lebanon and to put an end to the explosive situation in the south.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22631
21 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

(for the period 24 November 1990-20 May 1991)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 24 November 1990 to 20 May 1991. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently by resolution 679 (1990) of 30 November 1990.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. Composition and command

2. The composition of UNDOF as of May 1991 was as follows:

Austria	533
Canada	225
Finland	410
Poland	156 a/
	1 324
United Nations military observers (detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO))	7
	1 331

a/ Including one officer deployed as a military adviser to the representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan in accordance with the letter dated 12 March 1990 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/21188).

3. In addition to the above, UNTSO observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as the occasion requires.

4. Command of the Force continues to be exercised by Major-General Adolf Radauer.

B. Deployment

5. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within and close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistics units located nearby; UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The deployment of UNDOF as of May 1991, including the 11 observation posts manned by UNTSO observers, is shown on the map contained in the addendum to the present document.

6. At present, the Austrian battalion mans 20 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 28 patrols daily at irregular intervals on predetermined routes in the area of separation north and inclusive of the Damascus-Quneitra road. The Finnish battalion mans 16 positions and 5 outposts and conducts 26 patrols daily at irregular intervals in the area of separation south of the Damascus-Quneitra road. In the area of separation or in its close vicinity, 11 observation posts are manned by UNTSO military observers under the operational control of UNDOF.

7. The Austrian battalion base camp is located near Wadi Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Finnish battalion base camp is located near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Polish logistic unit, and the Finnish battalion shares Camp Ziouani with the Canadian logistic company. The Canadian signal unit has detachments at Camps Ziouani and Faouar as well as at Damascus. Military police detachments are located at Damascus and Camp Ziouani.

C. Casualties

8. During the period under review, UNDOF did not sustain any casualties. Since its inception, UNDOF has suffered 26 fatalities, 15 as a result of hostile action or accidents and 11 from other causes.

II. LOGISTICS

9. Second- and third-line logistic support continues to be provided by the Canadian and Polish logistic units. Damascus International Airport continues to serve as the UNDOF airhead for rotation; Tel Aviv International Airport is also used. The ports of Latakia and Tartous are used for sea shipments. An air movement control organization operates at Damascus, and sea shipments are handled by local agents. In-theatre air support is provided by UNTSO on special request.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. Functions and guidelines

10. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF, as well as its tasks, remain as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 November 1974. 1/

11. UNDOF has continued, with the cooperation of the parties, to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by contacts maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. Freedom of movement

12. The Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement provides for all contingents to operate with the freedom of movement that is necessary for their mission; however, the problem of restrictions on freedom of movement still exists. The Secretary-General will continue to exert all possible efforts to correct this situation.

C. Maintenance of the cease-fire

13. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire has been maintained and there have been no serious incidents during the period under review.

D. Supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement with regard to the areas of separation and limitation

14. UNDOF continues to supervise the area of separation to ensure, in accordance with its mandate, that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observations posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals on predetermined routes by day and night. In addition, temporary outposts are established and patrols are conducted from time to time to perform specific tasks. Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities (see S/17177, para. 17), civilians have continued to return to the area of separation, the population of which has doubled since the start of the mandate. The Syrian Arab Republic has stationed police in the area of separation in exercise of its administrative responsibility. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly to take account of these developments and to continue to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement.

15. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF continues to conduct fortnightly inspections of armament and force levels in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. UNDOF also lends its assistance and good offices on request from the parties. In carrying out its tasks, UNDOF has continued to receive the cooperation of both parties, especially in observance of limitations of armaments and forces, although restrictions on movement and inspection are placed on its teams in certain areas by both sides. UNDOF continues to seek the lifting of these restrictions so as to guarantee its freedom of access to all locations on both sides.

16. The safety of Syrian shepherds who graze their flocks close to the west of the A-line (see map contained in the addendum to the present document) continues to be of concern to UNDOF. The intensified patrolling of new mine-cleared patrol paths and, from time to time, the establishment of

standing patrols in these areas have helped to prevent incidents. The grazing security fence in the southern part of the area of separation has continued to be effective in reducing the number of incidents. New patrol paths along the A-line and B-line are under construction in the area of separation.

E. Mines

17. Mines continue to pose a threat to members of the Force and to the growing population in the area of separation. The Force is continuing its efforts to make its patrol tracks inside the area of separation safe from mines. During the period under review, three Polish mine-clearing teams cleared a total area of 44,520 square metres. The explosive ordnance found and destroyed by the United Nations or under United Nations supervision consisted of 1 anti-tank mine, 9 cluster bombs, 8 artillery shells, 1 mortar shell and 75 anti-tank shells, as well as quantities of small arms ammunition.

F. Humanitarian activities

18. During the reporting period, UNDOF assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with facilities for handing over parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation. Medical treatment is given to the local population in cases of emergency.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

19. By its resolution 45/243 of 21 December 1990, the General Assembly, inter alia, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNDOF at a rate not to exceed $3,446,500 gross ($3,366,500 net) per month for the period from 1 June to 30 November 1991, inclusive. This authorization was contingent upon the Security Council deciding to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 679 (1990) of 30 November 1990. Therefore, should the Security Council renew the UNDOF mandate beyond 31 May 1991, the cost to the United Nations of maintaining the Force up to 30 November 1991, will be within the commitment authority provided by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/243, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities. Appropriate financial provision will need to be made by the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session in respect of periods after 30 November 1991, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond that date.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

20. In deciding in its resolution 679 (1990) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and

requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution.

21. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the Secretary-General's report on the situation in the Middle East (A/45/726-S/21947), submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 44/40 A of 4 December 1989. The Secretary-General has continued to maintain contacts on the matter with the parties and interested Governments.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

22. UNDOF, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the cooperation of the parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet and there have been no serious incidents.

23. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I continue to hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

24. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 30 November 1991. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

25. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those that provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major-General Adolf Radauer, the Commander of the Force, to the officers and men and women of the Force, to its civilian staff and to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. They have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11563, paras. 8-10.